Although socioeconomic inequalities are assumed to increase the risk of conflict, the mechanisms behind how inequalities affect attitudes toward violence are poorly understood. The differences between individual (vertical) and group (horizontal) inequalities, and the role that perception of inequality plays, have not been investigated to any great extent due to limited data availability. This study aims at providing a better understanding of the effects of different kinds of inequality by testing new survey data collected in the Niger Delta. Using attitudes of acceptance of the use of violence as the dependent variable, the study compares the effects of horizontal and vertical inequalities and actual versus perceived inequalities. The effect of access to oil resources is also tested for horizontal inequalities (actual and perceived). The results show that both vertical and horizontal inequalities matter for the acceptance of violence. While relatively deprived individuals are more likely to support violence, among groups it is the relatively privileged. However, in oil regions, the more deprived groups are more likely to support violence. In general, perceived inequalities appear to be more important than actual inequalities.
share of oil revenues that should return to the oil-producing regions, several insurgency groups emerged in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Many of the militias were dominated by youths who grew up with conflict and felt that nonviolent protests did not lead anywhere (Ibaba 2011) . Further, the high rate of youth unemployment made militias an attractive alternative for young men. In 2004, the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF) was established and "declared war" on the Nigerian government in an attempt to control the region's oil resources. Shortly afterwards, in 2006, the Movement of the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) emerged, continuing the fight for more autonomy and resource control. According to spokesperson Jomo Gbomo, MEND's objective is "to totally destroy the capacity of the Nigerian government to export oil," 1 and it has operated mainly through sabotage, kidnapping, and oil bunkering. There has been a clear increase of violence and instability in the Niger Delta since the emergence of MEND.
Many studies have pointed to horizontal inequalities (inequalities between groups) tied to oil production in the Niger Delta as a motivator for conflict (Langer, Mustaha, and Stewart 2007; Langer and Ukiwo 2011; Ross 2007) . The theoretical reasoning is that socioeconomic inequalities between groups is more important here than inequalities between individuals (vertical inequalities), and that the more these inequalities are visible to group members, the more group members will be attracted to violence as a response (Stewart 2008) . However, limited data availability has prevented a proper investigation of these theoretical mechanisms. This study identifies four areas where better and more disaggregated data will shed new light on the relationship between inequalities and conflict.
First, I take a step back from looking at conflict occurrence to looking at how inequalities affect attitudes toward violence; I presuppose that the degree to which violence is accepted in a society has an effect on the society's potential for rebel recruitment and violence. This is supported by Linke, Schutte, and Buhaug (2014) , who find that regions with a high level of acceptance of violence among the population also see more violence. Thus, exploring how inequalities have an impact on attitudes toward violence in the general population can shed further light on conflict risk.
Second, I revisit the role of vertical inequalities (inequalities between individuals) and compare how horizontal and vertical inequalities each affect attitudes toward violence. While the theoretical literature suggests that vertical inequalities should play a role in conflict, large-N studies have failed to find a correlation; thus, vertical inequalities have been largely dismissed as a factor contributing to conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Sigelman and Simpson 1977; Weede 1981) . Østby (2008) suggests that vertical inequalities have little explanatory power because conflicts are not fought between individuals but between groups, which is why horizontal inequalities are more useful to look at. However, these previous studies are aggregated at the national level and thus fail to capture the inequality between individuals living in the actual conflict region. This study is able to look at specific conflict regions and thus takes a second look at the role of vertical inequalities compared to horizontal inequalities.
Third, this study specifically compares perceived inequalities to actual inequalities. When inequalities between groups become visible, particularly inequalities related to power and resources, they can deepen the rifts between these groups and spur conflict. Because people tend to act on beliefs rather than facts, the actual level of inequality might be less important than people's perception of differences between their own group and others (Langer and Smedts 2013) . Previous large-N studies have limited access to data on the differences between actual and perceived inequalities; thus the role they play in attitudes toward violence has not been explored.
Finally, it has been argued that access to increased high-value natural resources, particularly oil, is associated with socioeconomic inequalities. Hence it is reasonable to assume that the effect of horizontal inequalities is more likely to be stronger in areas with abundance of oil resources. However, there are few studies that directly test this.
To shed some more light on these knowledge gaps, three questions will be further scrutinized in this article: What are the effects of vertical inequalities (VI) and horizontal inequalities (HI) on attitudes toward violence? What is the effect of perceived inequalities compared to actual inequalities on attitudes toward violence? And how does the presence of oil resources affect these relationships? To test these questions I use new survey data collected in Nigeria.
I find that both VI and HI seem to affect attitudes toward violence, although in different ways. Among individuals, the relatively deprived are more likely to support violence. Among groups, however, it is the relatively privileged that are more likely to support violence. For both groups and individuals, I find clear evidence that perceived inequality is more important in determining attitudes toward violence than actual inequality. However, when it comes to horizontal inequalities in oil-producing regions, the effect is the opposite: Groups in actually deprived regions are more likely to support violence.
While the results from this study can only be generalized to the level of the four states included in the survey, the findings highlight the importance of revisiting VI and looking more deeply into perceived inequalities in other regions, as well as globally.
Theoretical framework and hypotheses
There is a growing literature arguing that socioeconomic inequalities between groups (horizontal inequalities, or HI) increase the likelihood of conflict (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013; Østby 2008; Stewart 2000) . Although conflicts are fought between groups, these groups consist of individuals who have chosen to participate in collective action. While previous studies have focused on whether HI increases the likelihood of conflict, less attention has been paid to looking into the role of HI as a motivation for individuals to join or support rebellions. After all, group violence ultimately depends on individual decisions to participate in the group activities, and rebel organizations need a critical mass of support to sustain power. McCormick and Giordano (2007) argue that for a rebel group to survive and prosper, it needs to be backed by a substantial part of the population.
Grievances related to the distribution of oil revenues between groups in the Niger Delta have been seen as a motivator for conflict (Langer et al. 2007; Langer and Ukiwo 2011; Ross 2007) . On the other hand, Oyefusi (2008) looks into what motivates young Ijaws in the Niger Delta to join a rebel group and suggests that we should also look at individual factors to understand why someone joins a rebel group. This article tries to join these two views by looking at how both horizontal and vertical inequalities affect each individual's attitude.
Social psychologists like Ajzen (2005:96) suggest that there is a correlation between attitudes toward an object and behavior toward the same object. Thus, factors that lead to participation in violent behaviors are also likely to affect the formation of attitudes toward violent behavior. In a study of Africa, Linke et al. (2014) , using similar attitude variables to the ones used in this article, find a positive relationship between people's attitudes toward violence and increase of violence in a region. Kladermans (1997) argues that every social movement has a mobilization potential that consists of all those who share the same beliefs or are sympathetic to the same collective action frame. Creating such a collective action frame requires a sense of identity and a distinction between us and them. Fjelde and Østby (2014) argue that "Violent mobilization related to collective demands for redistribution or in defense of the status quo distribution could also lead to inter-group competition." Thus visible differences between groups could be seen as a potential collective action frame that creates a sense of distinction and separate identities between groups. For example, Stewart (2000) argues that rebel leaders use HI to rally support for their group. While creating a collective action frame does not ensure participation, it is necessary to have a large pool of potential participants to create a viable social movement. Kladermans (1997) suggests four steps towards participation: (1) sympathizing with the movement, (2) mobilization, (3) motivation to participate, and (4) participation. In this article I focus on the first step, since sympathizing is the category most likely to catch a broad segment of the population. (1970) defines relative deprivation as the discrepancy between what people think they should have and what they actually have. Absolute deprivation refers to endemic poverty. Relative deprivation occurs when someone else's situation is-or is perceived to be-better or improving. While absolute deprivation is more likely to lead to apathy and inactivity, relative deprivation might cause frustration and grievances that can result in more radical actions such as political violence (Gurr 1970; Østby 2013) .
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Supporters of the resource mobilization or mobilization opportunity school (such as Muller and Weede 1990; Snyder and Tilly 1972; Tilly 1978) argue that, instead of focusing on grievances or frustrations, political violence can be better explained by rational actors who seek to improve their position through political and financial opportunities.
2 These criticisms are empirically supported by Sigelman and Simpson (1977) , Weede (1981) , and others who have found statistical evidence that overall well-being is a more critical factor in explaining political violence than income inequalities.
Along the same path, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2009) argue that factors such as financial and military viability are more important than grievances for maintaining a rebel organization because they provide more opportunities for the survival of the organization. The opportunity argument is tied to individuals' personal opportunities to join a rebellion. Nonetheless, large-N studies have failed to find a correlation between intra-individual inequality and conflict.
3 Østby (2008) points out that these results might be misleading because they test individual, not group inequalities. As Østby, Nordås, and Rød (2009:302) argue: "Civil wars are conflicts between groups-not confrontations between individuals randomly fighting each other." Gurr (1993) combines the deprivation and group mobilization theories. He views protest and rebellion among communal groups as motivated by grievances related to group status as well as to the strength of their group identity. Stewart (2000) was the first to introduce the concept of horizontal inequality, as opposed to vertical inequality. Based on case studies, she argues that mere differences in tradition, ethnicity, location, etc., are not enough to motivate conflict. However, when inequalities between groups become visible, See, for example, Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hegre, Gissinger, and Gleditsch 2003. particularly inequalities related to power and resources, they can deepen the rifts between the groups and spur conflict. She also notes that HI is related to the relative position (either privileged or deprived) of one group compared to another and not to absolute poverty. This idea is supported by Murshed (2009:77) , who argues that relative deprivation is considered one of the major causes of conflict and civil war, both in stimulating frustrations and as a unifying tool used by conflict entrepreneurs to mobilize conflict. Cederman et al. (2013:30-53) further advance HI theory by exploring the specific mechanisms that make HI lead to grievances, such as group identification, intergroup comparison, evaluation of injustice, framing and blaming, and further how grievances sometimes lead to conflict through mobilization.
The few large-N studies that test the link between HI and conflict generally find support for HI as a causal mechanism of conflict. Using household surveys that measure assets and provide information on the ethnic affiliation and geographical location of the respondent, both Østby (2008) and Østby et al. (2009) find that HI increases the risk of conflict in Africa; the latter article also finds that this is particularly true for regions with valuable natural resources. Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011) confirm these findings when analyzing a global data set of HI and ethnic groups. Further, through a thorough study of the political and economic exclusion of ethnic groups, Cederman et al. (2013) find that HI increases the risk of civil war. A study by Fjelde and Østby (2014) , one of the first to construct subnational inequality measures, finds that socioeconomic inequalities are associated with communal conflict in sub-Saharan Africa.
While the literature on HI explains why groups might be in conflict, these groups consist of individuals who have been motivated to fight collectively. The question is thus whether a group's relative position influences the attitudes toward violence and the likelihood of rebel recruitment or whether individual attitudes are merely a function of each individual's characteristics.
Vertical versus horizontal inequalities
As already discussed, previous literature has not found vertical inequality to be relevant. However, these studies look at the national level using the Gini index as a measure of vertical inequality (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Sigelman and Simpson 1977; Weede 1981) . I argue that national-level studies are not appropriate, as they do not tell us about the inequalities in the specific region where the conflict is occurring. Addressing this shortcoming requires disaggregated data and lower levels of analysis. For example, Fjelde and Østby (2014) use household surveys in sub-Saharan Africa, finding that both vertical and horizontal inequalities affect communal conflicts. This suggests that the effects of vertical inequalities should not yet be dismissed. More important, it also points to the importance of using individuals or households as the unit of analysis, which makes it possible to test the effect of both forms of inequality at the same time. I therefore find it useful to test both vertical and horizontal inequality in this article.
Hence, the first pair of hypotheses reflects economic inequality theories that are concerned with vertical inequality as well as the more recent debates on horizontal inequality. H1: Relatively deprived individuals are more likely to support violence.
H2:
Members of relatively deprived groups are more likely to support violence.
Perceived versus actual inequalities
While current studies acknowledge the importance of perceptions, they use actual inequality as a proxy. This is commonly based on the assumption that "perceptions broadly reflect the observed reality" (Stewart 2008:18) . This assumption, however, has little support from empirical studies. Robinson (1983:351) , for example, claims that there may be little or no link between perceived and actual inequality because "people being differentially placed socially, experience different parts of society, and because group interests, values and societal myths color perception." His view is supported by Langer and Mikami (2012) , who find large discrepancies between subjective and objective socioeconomic HIs in Nigeria, Ghana, Zimbabwe, Kenya, and Uganda. Others, like Holmquist (2012:25) , show that there is a positive correlation between actual group "disadvantages" and the perception of inequality. However, the correlations range from 27% to 33% depending on the indicators used. On the other hand, Langer and Smedts (2013) , using data from the Afrobarometer testing 19 African countries, find a negative correlation between people's perceptions of economic inequalities and actual inequalities.
The data used in this study also show that the measures for perceived and actual inequalities do not correspond. In Figures 1 and 2 , I have ranged the ethnic groups and regions from the lowest to the highest perceived HI (the blue line), and then added the line for the actual HI (red line). The graphs do not reveal any clear pattern between the two. This clearly questions whether previous studies using only actual HI are able to test the HI mechanisms to its full extent. Langer and Mikami (2012) suggest eight reasons why perceived and actual inequalities might differ: perception of the group situation influenced by personal background, manipulation by the elite and community leaders, inaccurate media reporting, lack of objective HI data, insufficient access to information, misleading comparisons, misjudgment of group size, and cross-dimensional contamination (that is, groups that are politically excluded might perceive themselves as economically excluded as well).
Hence, frustration and grievances might be based on the perceived rather than the actual situation. However, in the existing large-N studies on inequalities and conflict, measuring how a group's position is perceived has been difficult, so these studies have relied on data measuring groups' actual relative position.
Little research has been undertaken on the difference between perceived and actual vertical inequalities. In our survey, the respondents were not only asked how they perceived their situation, but their actual economic position was also measured, providing an opportunity to test how both perceived and actual inequalities affect the formation of attitudes toward violence. H4: Individuals who perceive their group to be relatively deprived are more likely to support violence.
The role of natural resources
Natural resources have been argued to increase the risk of conflict directly through resource capture, when insurgents are motivated by access to revenues that can finance belligerent movements or when inequalities and unmet expectations in the distribution of revenues (as well as the negative side effects of resource exploitation) create grievances. The risk of conflict can also be indirectly increased when resource sectors undermine economic performance and the quality of institutions . The conflict in the Niger Delta is largely blamed on the large inequalities that the oil revenues in the region produce. Le Billon (2001) argues that dependence on natural resources is associated with socioeconomic inequalities. Østby et al. (2009) further argue that the presence of natural resources in a region could further stimulate grievances caused by HI. Koubi and Böhmelt (2014) argue that the risk of civil war increases when the national economy is doing well but certain groups are not benefiting from this.
In resource-rich areas, like the Niger Delta, certain expectations of what people should receive might not be reflected in the actual situation. The gap between expectations and reality might be larger in resource-rich areas, and the frustration and grievances even deeper (Ross, Lujala, and Rustad 2012) . Ikelegbe (2001:437) states that the Niger Delta region is "one of the poorest, least developed and least reciprocated for its contributions to national wealth." On the other hand, the Niger Delta is relatively well off compared to the northern regions of Nigeria. Hence, the Niger Delta conflict could be motivated in part by the population perceiving that they are not getting enough-that is, they expect more benefits from the oil revenues extracted in their region than they actually get.
The literature on conflict natural resources has found that the strongest link between natural resources and conflict occurs when the resource in question is oil. Since oil is the main resource in the Niger Delta, this article specifically tests the link between oil and HI. Nonetheless, there is no reason to believe that other high-value natural resources such as diamonds, minerals, or other petroleum resources will not have the same link to HI.
To test this, I have included an additional hypothesis:
H5: Members of relatively deprived groups living in oil-producing regions are more likely to support violence.
Research design
Previously, Langer and Ukiwo (2008) have used data from a perception survey in Nigeria and Ghana to evaluate how people see their own identity and how state institutions are dominated by particular ethnic and religious groups. The same authors use survey data to look at the relationship between HI and militants in the Niger Delta. However, they do not investigate this using regression statistics (Langer and Ukiwo 2011) . Using survey data, Diprose (2009) 4 evaluates perceptions of social horizontal inequality in two communities in Indonesia. A thematically related study is Oyefusi's (2008) , which uses survey data to statistically analyze the willingness of young adults in the Niger Delta to join rebel groups. Further, Fjelde and Østby (2014) use household surveys to test the relationship between inequalities and communal violence.
As far as I am aware, however, there are no other studies linking both actual and perceived HI or VI to conflict using survey data. Using a new survey data set related to the Niger Delta conflict and collected in 2009, I am able to test the hypotheses described earlier.
The survey
The survey was conducted in collaboration with the Center for Advanced Social Science in Port Harcourt in Nigeria, in February 2009. 5 The survey covers four federal states in Nigeria: Rivers, Delta, and Abia (all situated in the Niger Delta), and Lagos. While Lagos is not in the Niger Delta, it is included as a comparison. Limited resources made inclusion of additional states unfeasible. These four states were chosen because they represent both oil-producing states (for example, Rivers and Delta are oil-producing states, while the other two are not producing oil). In addition, the four states had governors representing different political parties at the time of the survey. 6 Hence, the survey can only be generalized to the population within these four states.
A total of 1,200 randomly chosen respondents were asked 58 questions that covered standard information such as age, education, and ethnicity, and others specifically related to the Niger Delta conflict, democracy, and resource distribution.
Within the four states, 12 senatorial districts were randomly chosen, based on the criteria that the survey should include both rural and urban communities, as well as oil-producing and non-oil-producing areas. The survey was conducted before the amnesty in the Niger Delta was implemented. 6 The governors in Rivers and Delta represented the People's Democratic Party, the governor in Abia represented Progressive People's Alliance, and the governor in Lagos represented Action Congress.
shows the federal states and local government areas (LGA) in which the senatorial districts are situated, which are included in the survey.
Twenty-four enumerators, 12 women and 12 men, were hired to conduct the survey; each conducted 50 interviews. To achieve a gender balance in the data set and to avoid hesitation among the female respondents, the female enumerators interviewed only women and the male enumerators interviewed only men. Only people over 18 were interviewed. The questionnaires were translated into five local languages in addition to English (Gokana [Ogoni], Igbo, Ijaw, Yoruba, and Pidgin English) to ensure that the respondents fully understood the questions.
Random sampling was used to select location and household. At the selected household, the enumerators noted the names and gender of the household members who were 18 years or older and assigned a number to each of them. One of the household members was then asked to pick a number from a bag. The person whose assigned number tallied with the picked number was selected for the survey. If that person was not immediately available, the interview was postponed, and if that person could not be reached, another household was substituted.
Dependent variable: individual attitudes toward violence
This study addresses how HI can affect individual attitudes toward violence. To ensure some robustness, I have created two dependent variables, each based on questions from the survey asking specifically about people's attitudes toward violence. For each question, the respondent was asked to choose the statement they mostly identified with and was further asked to specify whether they agreed or strongly agreed with it. They were also given the option to answer do not agree with any of the statements or don't know.
7 Table 1 shows the frequency of answers from respondents who answered the questions. It's worth noting that the don't know category is small, suggesting that people were not hesitant to answer the question. Table 1 shows that the distribution between the options is similar for the two questions: It is almost identical for the first three options and somewhat higher for the fourth option, which indicates strong agreement that violence is not acceptable. Although there seems to be a higher share of respondents who feel that violence is not acceptable, the responses to both questions show that approximately 40% feel that violence is necessary. This indicates that a substantial part of the civilian population supports violent rebel activities. It is a possibility that social acceptance and a desire to support violence are driving the high number of support in the data. While this is difficult to check, it is likely that control variables like gender and age will reduce this effect.
For the dependent variables, all those who agreed with statement A (supporting violence) are coded 1, and those who agreed with statement B These questions have the same design as survey questions from the Afrobarometer.
are coded 0. Since I'm interested in those who support violence, I have coded all those who answered I don't know as 0, while those who answered agree with neither are coded as missing.
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Independent variables
In the following I first describe how actual and perceived inequality is measured, before explaining measurements of horizontal and vertical inequalities, presence of oil resources, and control variables.
Actual and perceived inequalities
To measure actual inequality, I create an asset wealth index (AWI) based on survey questions asking whether the respondent owns one or more of a certain type of valuable asset: a book, a radio, a TV, a bicycle, a motorcycle, a car, or land property. These assets represent personal wealth and are not indicators for what could be considered public goods such as sewage and electricity. Following Filmer and Pritchett (2001) and Hegre, Østby, and Raleigh (2009) , I generated a linear AWI, weighted according to their individual loading resulting from a principle component analysis. The AWI ranges from −4.35 to 2.27, and the mean is close to 0. While the AWI might not be a perfect measure for actual inequality, the survey does not include income data. Further, a measure of asset wealth has been frequently used by other HI studies (Fjelde and Østby 2014; Hegre et al. 2009; Østby 2008) . To test perceived inequality, I use the following question: "In general, how do you rate your living conditions compared to those of other Nigerians?" The scale ranges from 1 (much worse off) to 5 (much better off). Those who answered don't know are coded as missing. Table 2 shows the frequency of response. More than half of the respondents considers themselves as being better off than other Nigerians. Only 13.7% of the respondents consider themselves to be worse or much worse off. The perceived living condition variable tests how each of the respondents perceived their personal situation compared to others (vertical inequality). This might seem surprising, taking the Niger Delta context into account; however, Langer and Smedts (2013) find similar results using data from the Afrobarometer. Langer and Smedts (2013) argue that people's perception of their own situation is likely to color their perception of their group's situation; this is referred to as individual socioeconomic contamination. In an analysis of 19 African countries, Langer and Smedts find support for this claim. Based on this assumption, the perceived horizontal inequality is measured by aggregating individual measures within a given group.
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I have also tested the dependent variables where don't know is coded as missing; however, the results stays the same. Hence, to avoid more missing data, don't know is coded as 0. Other estimations of the DV are tested in the sensitivity section.
Horizontal inequality
Calculating HI requires a comparison of different groups. Stewart (2000) points at two types of groups related to HI: spatially different and culturally defined. Spatially different groups are typically politically units, such as federal states or lower governmental tiers. Culturally defined groups are identified by characteristics such as ethnicity, religion, or tribe. These are not mutually exclusive groups, and distinguishing between them could be important under different settings or contexts. Previous research has convincingly used both: Østby (2008) Districts. The survey includes 12 senatorial districts, three in each state. A total of 100 respondents were interviewed in each district. I use these districts as the basis for testing spatial HI and calculate the AWI average and average living condition score for each district. Table 3 shows how the regions score on these variables. The highest AWI was 0.964 (Abia Central) and the lowest −1.218 (Delta Central); however, for perceived living conditions, Delta Central scores slightly higher than Abia Central. The highest perceived average is 3.8 in both Delta South and Abia South; both regions also score high on assets average. The lowest perceived average is Delta North with 3.05; its AWI score is 3.98, the fourth highest. This further emphasizes the lack of correlation between the two inequality measures.
Cultural groups. Ethnic affiliation is very important in Nigeria. Many consider themselves to be a member of their ethnic group before a Nigerian. Hence, I use ethnicity as the basis for defining cultural groups. To define the respondents' ethnic affiliations, I use a variable from the survey in which the respondents were asked to determine their own ethnic belonging. Those who stated that they didn't know or who refused to answer have been coded as missing. Members of 24 ethnic groups responded to the survey; those who identified primarily as Nigerian were coded as a separate group. To avoid the results being driven by groups with few respondents, the HI variables include only groups with more than 20 respondents; the other respondents are grouped together and called "other ethnic groups." This limits the sample to eight specific ethnic groups plus the "other ethnic groups" category and the category of those who identify as Nigerian. Table 4 shows the number of respondents from each of these 10 groups, the group AWI average, and the average perceived living condition of the group. All 10 groups have an average perceived living condition above 3 (corresponding to "same" in Table 3 ), which indicates that all the included groups perceive that they are better off than others. It seems that the Ogonis have the lowest perception of their own position (3.4), yet they have the thirdhighest level of assets (3.96). This could reflect the events of the 1990s when Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) expressed its discontent and introduced the Ogoni Bill of Rights, 9 perhaps resulting in perceptions about the group's position that were not grounded in reality or that their actual situation has improved since the mid-90s but that their perceptions changed more slowly. On the other hand, the Urhobo, which has by far the lowest assets average, has a perceived average of 3.65 (third-best). It seems clear that the actual and perceived positions are not equivalent.
To check the validity of the data, I compared the ranking of the ethnic groups both for the AWI and perceived living standards with similar variables taken from the Afrobarometer. For the AWI I find very similar results; the one major deviation is that the Itsekiri seem to be better off in the Afrobarometer data than in the survey data I use (see Figure A2 in the appendix). For perceived standard of living, the difference seems to be bigger. The main deviation is that the Ijaws seem to perceive themselves as worse off compared others in the Afrobarometer (see Figure A1 in the appendix). However, when I compare my survey data with the data from Cederman et al. (2011) , it is clear that the Ijaws are relatively better off than other groups, as suggested also by my AWI data. As one could expect, the overlap is not perfect, but correlations are big enough to give validation to my data.
Calculating relative group deprivation. To test the hypotheses, I created a measure for relative group deprivation, comparing each group's average living condition with the group average for the group that each respondent would be likely to compare him-or herself with. For example, the district with the highest AWI score, that is, the wealthiest district, was Abia Central. However, this does not mean that respondents living in Lagos or Rivers would compare themselves to people in Abia Central, as they might not know how well off those in Abia Central are. People are more likely to compare themselves with those who are in closest proximity and with whom they interact with on a daily basis. Hence, to get a realistic comparison, the districts are compared to the best district in the same state.
For the relative group deprivation for ethnic groups, I compared each respondent's ethnic group average with the average for the largest ethnic group living in same state as the respondent, which is similar to the approach used by Fjelde and Østby (2014) . This means that not all respondents from the same ethnic group compare themselves to the same ethnic group, as members of the same ethnic group live in different states.
In practical terms, this means that the relatively worst-off group has the highest score on the variable, and the relatively privileged has the lowest score. This means that a positive relationship between HI and support for violence in the regression analysis suggests that the worse off the group, the higher the level of support for violence by the individuals within that group.
Vertical inequality
To test for individual inequality, that is, the respondent's personal situation (Hypothesis 1a), I use each respondent's AWI score and response to their perceived living condition. To make these variables more comparable with the relative group deprivation variables, I created an individual relative deprivation measure by comparing each individual with the score for the individual on the 10th percentile score within their district (that is, the cutoff point between the 10% richest and 90% poorest) on the AWI. I use the 10th percentile instead of the highest score to make the analysis less sensitive to outliers, that is, to avoid the analysis being driven by a comparison with one very rich individual. For the perceived inequality, all respondents are compared to the highest score, which is 5.
Oil production
To test whether the effect of inequalities on attitudes toward violence are stronger in oil-producing regions (Hypothesis 3), I create an interaction variable between the oil-producing dummy and the inequality variables. The oil-producing dummy indicates whether the respondent lives in an oil-producing district or not. These districts correspond with the districts used to create the HI variable. Whether a district is oil-producing or not is defined in the sampling of the survey.
Control variables
I control for gender (coded 1 for men and 0 for women) and age based on the assumption that violence is often carried out by young men. I also include a dummy variable set for education, where higher education is the reference category, based on the assumption that education decreases the likelihood of supporting violence. Finally, I control for the respondent's state, to control for other state-specific factors that could affect the dependent variable. I do this by including a dummy variable set for the four states, using Lagos as the reference category. Table 5 shows descriptive statistics for all the variables.
Results
This article aims to shed new light on theories of socioeconomic inequality by using new survey data to investigate three questions: What are the effects of vertical inequalities (VI) and horizontal inequalities (HI) on attitudes toward violence? What is the effect of perceived inequalities compared to actual inequalities on attitudes toward violence? And how does the presence of oil resources affect these relationships?
The results of the analysis testing Hypotheses 1-4 can be found in Table 6 ; models 1 and 2 test the HI between districts, while models 3 and 4 test the results for ethnic HI. Models 1 and 3 use a dependent variable based on Question 50, while in models 2 and 4 the dependent variable is based on Question 55.
The results for models 1 and 2 are fairly similar: The district actual HI variable is insignificant in both, while district perceived HI is significant. However, the coefficient is negative, which suggests that those who are members of groups that are perceived as better off are more likely to support violence. Figure 4 shows how the risk of supporting violence is related to the level of HI based on Model 1.
We can see that perceived HI have a much steeper curve than the actual inequalities, suggesting that changes in perceived HI will have more effect than changes in actual HI. When I further explore this, it becomes clear that the effect of perceived HI differs between different types of respondents. For a man living in Rivers State, the risk of supporting violence increases from 61% to 81% when going from the 10th percentile relatively worse off to the 10th percentile best off. In comparison, for a woman living in Abia State, the likelihood of supporting violence increases only from 14% to 31%. This tells us two things: First, that men from Rivers State are in general more likely to support violence compared to women from Abia. And second, that for women in Abia an increase in HI actually more than doubles the risk of supporting violence, while for men in Rivers the relative increase is lower, but still high. Hence, HI seems to be important.
On the other hand, the perceived VI variable is significant and positive in both models, suggesting that individuals who perceive themselves as relatively worse off are more likely to support violence. The actual VI measure is only significant in Model 1. In Model 3 we turn to ethnic group Logit regression coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01. HI. Here the ethnic actual HI and the actual VI measures are insignificant, while the perceived ethnic HI and perceived VI measures are significant and follow the same pattern as in models 1 and 2. The substantial effects for perceived ethnic HI resembles those in Model 1, but the effect of HI is smaller (See Table A1 in the appendix). In Model 4 none of the variables is significant. In terms of control variables, we see that age and gender are fairly robust across the models, suggesting that young men are more likely to support violence. This is not a very surprising finding. More surprising is that the dummy for oil-producing districts is significant-but negative-in three of the models, suggesting that living in an area where oil is produced decreases the risk of supporting violence. Level of education does not seem to have any affect. The state dummies suggest that those living in Abia are less likely to support violence compared to respondents from Lagos, while those living in Rivers and Delta are more likely to support violence compared to those living in Lagos. These could be because those living in Rivers and Delta have been more exposed to the violence in the Niger Delta. However, these results vary somewhat across the models.
The findings in Table 1 provide mixed support for the hypotheses in this study. The first pair of hypotheses looks at the difference between horizontal and vertical inequalities: H1: Relatively deprived individuals are more likely to support violence, and H2: Members of relatively deprived groups are more likely to support violence. The models suggest that there is correlation between both HI and VI and support for violence. However, it seems that while relatively deprived individuals support violence, we find the opposite effect when we look at groups. Hence, only H1 is supported. One explanation could be that when a group is perceived to be relatively well off, the members are afraid to lose this position and hence will support violence in order to keep it; however, we would not see that same mechanism on an individual level.
The second set of hypotheses looks into the difference between perceived and actual inequalities: H3: Members of actual relatively deprived groups are more likely to support violence, and H4: Individuals who perceive their group to be relatively deprived are more likely to support violence. The four models show a trend suggesting that both perceived HI and VI have more influence than actual HI and VI. As pointed out earlier, the HI variables are negative, suggesting that the less relatively deprived (that is, more relatively privileged) a group is, the more likely the members of the group is to support violence. Hence neither of the hypotheses can be verified.
To further investigate these results, I ran the analyses in Models 1-2, adding a squared term for the HI variables to test if there is curvilinear relationship, that is, that both the relatively deprived and relatively privileged support violence, as suggested by Stewart (2008) . I included perceived and actual HI in separate models. The results in Table 7 show that both the regular and squared district actual HI variables (Models 5 and 6), are insignificant. In Model 7 the perceived district HI variable is significant, while the squared term is not; in Model 8 it is the opposite. However, the two models indicate two different curvilinear patterns, so no conclusion can be made based on this. This result does not resemble the general findings in Cederman et al. (2011) that there is a parabolic relationship. However, the relationship described by Cederman et al. may not be evident in this study because the two studies are quite different in both size and what is being tested.
In Table 8 , I report the findings for Hypothesis 5: Members of relatively deprived groups living in oil-producing regions are more likely to support violence. The table shows only the results for Question 50, although the results are similar for both dependent variables. The control variables are consistent with Table 6 . I have run a separate analysis for the interaction between oil and actual HI and perceived HI. Models 9 and 10 look at the HI at the district level, while Models 11 and 12 look at HI at the level of ethnic groups.
Only in Model 12 are all three of the variables included in the interaction significant. In Models 9-11, only two of the three are significant. However, while there are some differences in degree of significance, the trend is the same in all four models. They all suggest that if your group is relatively deprived and you live in an oil-producing region, you are more likely to support violence. In each of these analyses, the HI variables measure the effect of HI among those who do not live in oil regions, that is, those who are coded 0 in the interaction term; this effect is negative, which suggests that oil has a specific influence on the effect of HI. Logit regression coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
The conclusion from these analyses is that oil does have an effect on the influence of HI and that for this survey sample it seems that H5 is verified. This is in agreement with the literature on the Niger Delta claiming that HI is particularly important in this region due to the oil resources.
Sensitivity analyses
In order to test the robustness of the analyses, I ran a variety of sensitivity tests, both on the dependent variables and the independent variables. I first ran all the analyses using a dependent variable where only those that answered strongly agree with the statement supporting violence were coded 1 and the rest 0. I consider this group of respondents to have most clearly expressed an acceptance of violence. The results from Table 1 hold. In Table A2_2 in the appendix, the squared terms for perceived HI suggest a similar curvilinear relationship in both models, but neither is significant. In Table 3 , only the interaction between district actual HI and oil is significant. While the results seem a bit weaker, they still confirm the findings from the original analyses (the analyses can be found in Table A2_1 , A2_2, and A2_3 in the appendix). Logit regression coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
To check whether the actual and perceived HI affect each other in the analyses, I ran the analyses in Table 1 and included only one measure of HI in each analysis. This had no impact on the results (the analyses can be found in Table A3_1 and A3_2 in the appendix).
To test whether my calculation of HI variables is driving the results, I include an analysis using HI variables where the respondents are compared to the sample mean rather than the best ethnic group or district in the state. The results in Table A4_1 and A4_3 in the appendix (replicating Table 1 and 3 in the original analysis), generally support the findings, although a few variables become insignificant. In Table A4_2 , we see that the results remain the same for perceived HI, but we see a curvilinear relationship for actual HI.
Finally, I controlled whether the data were affected by the extent to which respondents belonged to the Ijaws ethnic group. According to my data, Ijaws as a group score highly on both perceived wealth and actual wealth and are often related to many of the militant groups in the Niger Delta such as MEND. To control for this, I ran all the analyses testing ethnic HI with a control for whether the respondent was an Ijaw or not. This did not have any impact on the results (see Table A5 in the appendix).
Concluding remarks
Previous literature looking into the link between socioeconomic inequalities and conflict has been limited by data availability. While a statistical correlation between the two has been found, this is restricted to measures of actual HI and to the occurrence of conflict. In this article I identify three research gaps that the current literature does not address. First, while rebellions require collective action, they comprise individuals who have (most often) made the choice to participate. Hence, it is interesting to look at whether individual or group inequalities (or both) affect this choice, based on individual-level survey data and not on national-level aggregated data. In this study I posit that the Niger Delta is a most-likely case for testing the assumed mechanisms between inequalities and conflict. Using survey data at the individual level, I am able to measure both the individual and group inequality of each respondent and test how they affect attitudes toward violence.
Second, the HI literature generally builds on the assumption that how people perceive their situation is as relevant as the actual situation. Thus it has been assumed that actual HI can work as a proxy for perceived HI. In this study I show that this is not the case and that there is in fact very little correlation between the two measures (see Figures 1 and 2) .
Finally, it has been suggested that the abundance of natural resources increases socioeconomic differences and could hence further strengthen the effect of HI. I find support for this in the analyses.
In the analysis I find that both VI and HI affect people's attitudes toward violence. However, it seems that the two have opposite effects: Individuals who perceive themselves as relatively deprived are more likely to support violence, while members of groups that are perceived (by the members) to be relatively privileged are more likely to support violence than those who are members of relatively deprived groups. The theory of HI argues that it is not only the relatively deprived that experience grievances. The relatively privileged could fear the loss of position, politically or economically, which could also motivate support of violence (Stewart 2000) . Many argue (for example, Langer et al. 2007; Langer and Ukiwo 2011; Ross 2007 ) that in the case of the Niger Delta, this could be related to the abundance of oil revenues in the region, particularly in the Ijaw-dominated areas. Unfair distribution of oil revenues has been one of the main causes of violence from MEND and NDPVF, who argue that the oil-producing regions in the Niger Delta, which are relatively well off compared to other parts of Nigeria, should get a larger share of the revenues. This could be a causal explanation for the results in the analyses. However, looking at the interaction of HI and oil production in this study shows that members of relatively deprived groups living in oil-producing regions are more likely to support violence.
Another interesting finding in this study is that at both the individual and group levels, perceived inequality seems to matter more than the actual situation. Stewart (2000) argues that HI can be used by leaders to rally for mobilization. In this case, it is not necessarily the actual situation that becomes important but how it is perceived or presented. This further underscores the importance of differentiating between actual and perceived inequality and not using one as a proxy for the other.
The results in this article do not give immediate support to the findings by Cederman et al. (2011) , who find that Hi increases the risk of civil war; the results in this study are not one-directional. Nonetheless, while they are only valid for the states that are included in the sample, they do show an interesting trend and underscore that the relationship between HI and conflict is not as straightforward as the Cederman et al. (2011) study suggest. This indicates that further exploration into the relationship between actual and perceived inequalities-both horizontal and vertical-is worth pursuing.
The most important policy implication to take from this study is that inequalities matter-and in particular how people perceive inequalities. Hence, decisions from politicians, policymakers, extractive companies, and others working in the Niger Delta region should not only take into account the actual situation but also how it is viewed by the local population. This underscores the importance of, for example, cooperation between the extractive industry and civil society to avoid creating more inequalities, both perceived and actual.
This study also points to the importance of being able to gather good survey data to capture the mechanisms within conflict studies. Future research could overlie the HI variables with actual georeferenced conflict events to see if the HI measures can explain occurrence of conflict in the region as well. Figure A2 . Comparing AWI average for ethnic groups using data from the Nigeria survey and data from the Afrobarometer round 3
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